The World Colour Survey (WCS) identifies cross linguistic commonalities in colour-terms (Kay & Regier, 2003) . Steels and Belpaeme (2005) present computer simulations designed to test the abilities of competing theories to produce a consistent set of colour terms, both within and across communities. The three theories tested are Nativism (colour categories are innate) Empiricism (colour categories are individually learned from the colours in the environment) and Culturalism (colour categories are coordinated by language). All three models presume a common model of colour terms in which a colour term is a label or name for a mental category. This view is problematic in light of the facts that newborn infants react to light in categorical manner (Bornstein, 1997) , but take a long time to learn to use colour-terms for colour, and an even longer time to learn to use them for appropriately (Sandhofer & Smith, 2001 ). Whatever mechanism ensures infants' innate responses to colours appears not to form the basis of their acquisition and use of colour terms.
The notion that colour terms are names for mental colour categories derives from a commonly held view that language is essentially a vehicle for encoding and decoding mental entities. This view is problematic and neither necessary nor well founded (Wittgenstein, 1958; Harris, 1981) . Integrationalist linguistics is an alternative to this "language myth" in which "signs are not prerequisites of communication, but its products" (Harris, 2005, p. 110) .
In this paper I present a reanalysis of the WCS data which avoids the problems associated with standard "colour spaces" highlighted by Saunders and van Brackel (1997) . Cross linguistic universal properties of colour terms are identified and related to data on infant innate colour responses. The universal properties of colour terms are examined within an integrational model. Colour terms emerge in a language through human interactions to which colour is relevant. In order for colour terms to emerge from such interactions (both through interpretation and creative use of language) there must exist correlations between colours and what is being communicated. Innate responses to colour are an integral part of the mechanism which drives languages to divide colours along the same fault-lines, though they do not provide "mental representations" underpinning colour terms.
Several evolutionary mechanisms are identified which conspire to make colour a semi-reliable signal in the environment: the evolution of innate responses to naturally occurring colour signals (e.g., the change from green to red of many ripened fruits); the evolution of colour signals on organisms in response to the evolutionary pressures set up by other animals' colour responses (e.g., the evolution of black and yellow stripes on wasps and bees); and niche selection by animals with hardwired colour responses. These mechanisms tend to correlate colours in the human behavioural environment with properties of coloured objects. That is, colour tends to becomes a signal, the "meaning" of which is correlated with innate responses to colour. These colour signals form the basis of the correlations between human communicational acts and colours from which colour-terms (or terms used like colour-terms) can arise. Brill (1997) suggests that colour science underpins the technologies that colour the modern world and so shapes modern colour responses. The model presented here parallels this idea with the notion that innate colour response tunes (and is tuned to) colouring of the human-relevant environment, and this relationship underpins the universal tendencies of colour terms. This model is simultaneously Nativist, Empiricist and Culturalist, though with a non-mentalist flavour.
